The Asymmetric Marketplace: Regulatory Capture, Competitive Neutrality, and the Future of American Higher Education – Podcast Research Series 2026 | Higher Education Policy Research

The Asymmetric Marketplace: Regulatory Capture, Competitive Neutrality, and the Future of American Higher Education

Institutional Research Notice & Introduction

Di Tran University – College of Humanization | Research 2026

Di Tran University publishes this paper as part of its ongoing applied research mission to examine how educational systems, regulatory frameworks, and economic incentives affect human opportunity, workforce access, and social mobility.

This publication is provided for research, academic discussion, and policy analysis purposes only.

Important Institutional Clarifications

• Di Tran University is not a regulator, policymaker, accreditor, or licensing authority.
  This paper does not represent regulatory guidance, legal advice, or institutional lobbying positions.
• The analyses and conclusions presented are research findings, not institutional mandates, endorsements, or political advocacy by Di Tran University.
• All institutions referenced—public, nonprofit, and proprietary—are discussed within an academic framework focused on systems, incentives, and outcomes, not organizational intent or character.
• Case studies included are illustrative and analytical in nature.
  They are used to explore broader structural dynamics and do not constitute promotional material, recruitment messaging, or institutional endorsement.
• Di Tran University does not oppose public education, private education, or nonprofit education.
  The research framework applied here evaluates outcomes, efficiency, transparency, and human impact, regardless of institutional form.
• Data sources, citations, and policy references are publicly available and are presented to encourage further independent review, debate, and scholarly inquiry.

Purpose of This Research

This paper examines:

• Regulatory asymmetries within U.S. higher education
• The economic and human impacts of compliance-driven policy design
• Competitive neutrality as a framework for evaluating educational value
• Student outcomes across differing institutional models

The goal is to contribute to informed, evidence-based dialogue on how education systems can better serve learners—particularly non-traditional, working, immigrant, and underserved populations—without presupposing ideological conclusions.

Academic Independence Statement

Publication of this research does not imply endorsement of all interpretations or policy recommendations by Di Tran University, its faculty, affiliates, or partner organizations.

Di Tran University affirms its commitment to:

• Academic freedom
• Research transparency
• Open inquiry
• Human-centered educational analysis

Executive Summary

The American system of higher education, long heralded as a beacon of opportunity and innovation, operates within a market structure that is fundamentally distorted by regulatory asymmetry. For decades, federal and state policies have evolved to normalize heavy public-sector reliance on federal aid while simultaneously concentrating scrutiny, sanctions, and skepticism on small private providers. This report, grounded in an exhaustive review of legislative history, lobbying expenditures, and student outcome data, argues that this bifurcation has effectively insulated large public systems from the competitive pressures necessary to drive quality, while systematically dismantling the small business sector of education that often serves the most marginalized student populations.

The central thesis of this analysis is that the regulatory environment has been captured by incumbent interests—primarily large public university systems and their formidable lobbying allies—to create a “moat” that protects their market share. Through mechanisms such as the 90/10 rule, the disparate application of Gainful Employment standards, and a monolithic accreditation system, the policy framework creates a double standard: public reliance on taxpayer funds is viewed as a virtuous investment in the “common good,” while private reliance on the same funds is framed as a “predatory” transfer of wealth.

This report details how these policies function not merely as consumer protections, but as barriers to entry that stifle innovation and wipe out small schools. It examines the “substitution effect,” revealing that when private schools are forced to close, students are often funneled into community colleges where completion rates are statistically lower and resources are already stretched thin. Furthermore, it highlights emerging models of “debt-free” private education, such as the Louisville Beauty Academy, which demonstrate that the private sector is capable of high-value, low-cost delivery when not strangled by regulatory hour-inflation and compliance costs.

To restore high-quality education, the United States must move toward a policy of Competitive Neutrality. By judging all institutions—public, non-profit, and proprietary—by the same metrics of student completion, debt repayment, and earnings premiums, policymakers can reintroduce the competitive forces that drive efficiency and excellence. This report serves as a roadmap for understanding the current imbalances and charting a diplomatic yet decisive path toward a truly pluralistic educational marketplace.

I. The Political Economy of Higher Education: Asymmetry in Influence

The governance of higher education in the United States is not determined solely by pedagogical best practices but is significantly shaped by the political economy of the sector. The distribution of Title IV funds—federal student loans and Pell Grants—creates a marketplace heavily subsidized by taxpayers. In this marketplace, the ability to shape regulation is as critical to institutional survival as the ability to educate students. The current landscape is defined by a massive imbalance in political influence, where the “public” sector leverages its status to lobby for protections that the “private” sector is denied.

1.1 The Lobbying Disparity: “Big Public” vs. Small Business

The narrative that higher education is strictly a “public good” has allowed public and non-profit institutions to occupy a privileged position in the policy debate, shielded from the skepticism applied to businesses. This position is reinforced by a massive lobbying infrastructure. Organizations such as the American Council on Education (ACE), the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU), and the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU)—collectively known as the “Big Six”—exert profound influence over federal legislation.¹

While the proprietary sector is represented by Career Education Colleges and Universities (CECU), its influence is dwarfed by the sheer scale and historical entrenchment of the public university lobby. For instance, in 2024 and 2025, while CECU increased its advocacy efforts to combat existential regulatory threats, ACE and its coalition mobilized effectively to shape the “Accountability in Higher Education and Access Through Demand-driven Workforce Pell” (AHEAD) committee negotiations, ensuring that new accountability frameworks would be palatable to their diverse membership, which includes large public research universities.³

The disparity is not just financial; it is reputational. Large public institutions effectively lobby using public funds—a cycle where taxpayer money flows to the university, which funds membership in associations, which then lobby for more taxpayer money and fewer regulations. In contrast, small private schools, often operating on thin margins, lack the resources to maintain a permanent lobbying presence in Washington, D.C. This leaves them vulnerable to broad-brush legislation that treats a small, family-owned trade school with the same severity as a massive, publicly traded corporation.⁵

1.2 The Normalization of Public Subsidies

A central tenet of the prevailing policy framework is that public institutions are “safe” stewards of federal funds, while private institutions are inherently risky. This normalization overlooks the reality that public institutions are heavily subsidized not just by Title IV aid but by direct state appropriations. When a public university receives federal aid, it is viewed as an alignment of interests; when a private college receives the same aid, it is often characterized as a “transfer of wealth” from taxpayers to shareholders or business owners.⁷

This double standard ignores the fungibility of money. A dollar of federal aid spent at a community college with a 20% graduation rate arguably represents a lower return on investment (ROI) for the taxpayer than a dollar spent at a private trade school with an 80% placement rate. Yet, the regulatory apparatus focuses almost exclusively on the latter. The “public good” narrative effectively shields public systems from the harsh scrutiny of cost-benefit analysis, allowing them to absorb vast amounts of capital without the corresponding pressure to demonstrate efficiency or labor market relevance.⁹

1.3 Regulatory Capture in Accreditation

The accreditation system, originally a voluntary process for peer review initiated in the late 19th century, was deputized by the Higher Education Act of 1965 to serve as the gatekeeper for federal funds.⁹ Because accrediting agencies are private bodies comprised largely of representatives from established institutions, they are susceptible to “regulatory capture.” Dominant regional accreditors often protect the status quo, creating high barriers to entry for new, innovative, or small private providers.⁹

Critics argue that this system functions like a cartel. Established public and non-profit universities face little risk of losing accreditation; their reviews are often procedural formalities. In contrast, small private schools—particularly those with specialized or accelerated models—face rigorous, expensive, and often bureaucratic hurdles to prove their worthiness.¹² This creates a “closed loop” where federal aid flows primarily to legacy institutions, stifling the competition that could drive down costs and improve quality. The refusal of the federal government to recognize new accreditors that might specialize in competency-based or vocational education further cements this monopoly.¹²

II. The 90/10 Rule: A Case Study in Structural Bias

Perhaps no policy better illustrates the targeted scrutiny of private providers than the 90/10 rule. This regulation prohibits for-profit institutions from deriving more than 90% of their revenue from Title IV federal student aid.¹ The remaining 10% must come from non-federal sources, such as cash payments from students, employer contributions, or state grants.

2.1 The Rationale and the Hypocrisy

The stated intent of the 90/10 rule is market validation: if a school provides high-quality education, students or employers should be willing to pay at least a fraction of the cost out of pocket. If a school is entirely dependent on federal vouchers, the argument goes, it is essentially a government contractor evading government oversight.¹

However, this logic is conspicuously absent when applied to public institutions. Many community colleges and state universities rely heavily on a combination of federal Title IV aid and direct state subsidies. If one were to calculate a “90/10” ratio for community colleges that included state appropriations as “public funding,” many would fail the test spectacularly. They are often 100% publicly funded. Yet, because the funding comes through two different government channels (federal Title IV and state appropriations), they are exempt from the market validation test imposed on private competitors.⁸

Table 1: The 90/10 Double Standard

Feature	Small Private School (For-Profit)	Public Community College
Federal Aid Limit	Capped at 90% of revenue.	Unlimited (100% reliance allowed).
State Appropriations	Generally $0 (must survive on tuition).	Significant portion of operating budget.
Market Validation	Must find 10% “cash” revenue (students/employers).	No requirement to prove cash-pay viability.
Penalty for Reliance	Loss of Title IV eligibility; Closure.	None; viewed as “fully funded.”
Risk	High scrutiny; existential threat.	Zero scrutiny on revenue mix.

2.2 The Impact on Small Business and Access

For small private schools, the 90/10 rule acts as a cap on growth and a perverse incentive to raise tuition. To meet the 10% threshold, schools must find revenue streams outside of federal loans. Paradoxically, this incentivizes schools to raise tuition above the federal loan limits so that students are forced to pay the “gap” in cash, thereby satisfying the 10% requirement. Alternatively, it forces schools to aggressively recruit students who have access to non-Title IV funds.⁸

This regulatory constraint disproportionately hurts small, specialized schools that serve low-income populations—the very demographic that relies most on federal aid. A small beauty academy or coding bootcamp serving a disadvantaged community in an economically depressed area may struggle to find students with cash on hand, effectively barring them from the market regardless of the quality of their training.⁷ Meanwhile, a local community college can enroll the same students with full federal subsidization and no requirement to prove “market validation” through cash payments.

2.3 The Veteran Loophole Closure

Recent amendments to the Higher Education Act, fully effective as of 2023, tightened the 90/10 rule by closing the “loophole” that allowed military benefits (GI Bill) to count as the “10%” non-federal revenue.¹⁵ Previously, private schools could recruit veterans because their GI Bill funds counted as “private” money for the purpose of the ratio.

While intended to protect veterans from predatory recruiting, this change further constricts the operational viability of small private schools that have historically served military populations well. Private trade schools are often favored by veterans for their accelerated timelines and credit-for-prior-learning policies, which align better with the needs of adult learners than the rigid semester schedules of community colleges.¹³ By classifying GI Bill funds as federal aid, the government effectively places a quota on how many veterans a private school can serve. Once the 90% cap is reached, the school must turn away veterans or recruit cash-paying civilians to balance the ledger, reducing educational choice for those who have served.

III. Gainful Employment and the Evolution of “Do No Harm”

The “Gainful Employment” (GE) regulations represent the most contentious battleground in the war between “accountability” and “market neutrality.” Historically, GE rules penalized programs where graduates carried high debt relative to their earnings—but only if those programs were offered by for-profit institutions or were non-degree certificate programs at public/non-profit institutions.¹

3.1 The Target: Private Sector Accountability

Under the Obama-era and Biden-era GE rules, a program could lose access to federal aid if its graduates’ debt-to-earnings ratios exceeded certain thresholds (typically 8% of total earnings or 20% of discretionary earnings).¹⁷ This framework explicitly targeted the for-profit sector. The assumption was that high debt and low earnings were a unique pathology of “profit-seeking” in education.

However, data consistently shows that many public sector programs—particularly in the arts, humanities, and social work—also produce graduates with high debt-to-earnings ratios.¹⁹ Yet, these programs were largely shielded from GE sanctions because they led to “degrees” at non-profit institutions, which were presumed to have intrinsic value beyond immediate labor market returns. This distinction created a protected class of underperforming public programs while ruthlessly culling private competitors.²⁰ The lobbying efforts of ACE and others were instrumental in maintaining this distinction, arguing that holding liberal arts programs to earnings metrics would undermine the “mission” of higher education.²¹

3.2 The Shift to “Financial Value Transparency” (2024-2026)

In a significant development, the regulatory landscape began to shift around 2024-2025. The Department of Education introduced “Financial Value Transparency” (FVT), which aimed to provide data on all programs, regardless of sector.¹⁷ This was a step toward neutrality, acknowledging that students deserve to know the financial outcomes of a philosophy degree at a state university just as much as a cosmetology certificate at a private academy.

By January 2026, the discourse evolved further with the “Accountability in Higher Education and Access Through Demand-driven Workforce Pell” (AHEAD) committee reaching consensus on a new framework. This framework seeks to harmonize the “Do No Harm” standard with existing regulations, effectively replacing the sector-specific GE rules with a universal earnings premium test.²³

3.3 The Universal Standard: A Diplomatic Victory?

The proposed 2026 framework requires all programs to demonstrate that their graduates earn more, on average, than a comparison group of high school graduates (the “earnings premium”).²⁴ This represents a potential watershed moment for competitive neutrality. If implemented faithfully, it would strip away the protective veil of the “public/non-profit” label.

• Implication for Public Schools: Many underperforming public programs that have survived on the “public good” myth would face sanctions for the first time. For example, Associate’s degrees in liberal arts with low transfer rates and low earnings would no longer be shielded.
• Implication for Private Schools: Small private providers that deliver strong ROI (e.g., in skilled trades, nursing, or specialized tech) would no longer be stigmatized. They would compete on a level playing field where “value” is defined by economic outcome, not tax status.

However, the transition is fraught with political peril. Public university lobbies are expected to push for exemptions, arguing that the “earnings premium” test ignores the non-monetary value of liberal education.²¹ Resisting these exemptions is crucial for maintaining a truly competitive market. If the rules are watered down for public institutions, the asymmetry will persist, and the “Do No Harm” standard will become yet another weapon used exclusively against the private sector.

IV. The Micro-Economics of Licensing: The Cosmetology Case Study

The cosmetology and beauty industry serves as a potent microcosm of how regulation is used to stifle competition and maintain high costs, often to the detriment of students and small businesses. It reveals how state-level lobbying, often aligned with large incumbent schools, creates barriers to entry that have little to do with public safety.

4.1 The License Hour Inflation

State licensing boards, often dominated by representatives from large established schools and incumbent industry players, mandate extensive instructional hours for licensure—often far exceeding what is necessary for health and safety.¹⁴

• The 1,500 Hour Norm: In many states, a cosmetology license requires 1,500 to 2,000 hours of training. By comparison, becoming an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)—a job where life and death are literally in the balance—often requires fewer than 150 hours.
• The “Time Tax”: These inflated hours force students to stay in school longer, preventing them from working and forcing them to take on more debt to cover living expenses.⁷ This “opportunity cost” is a hidden tax on the student.
• The “Captive Audience”: Schools benefit from these mandates because they guarantee a long revenue stream per student. The curriculum often expands to fill the mandated time rather than focusing on efficiency.⁷

4.2 Wealth Transfer and Regulatory Capture

Research by the Institute for Justice (IJ) highlights that these licensing regimes function as a “wealth transfer” from students and taxpayers to schools. When states reduce hour requirements, schools almost immediately reduce their program lengths to match, proving that the extra hours were never about educational necessity but about regulatory compliance.⁷

This environment hurts small, innovative schools that might otherwise offer accelerated, competency-based programs. If a school could train a competent cosmetologist in 800 hours using modern technology and intensive training, they are legally forbidden from doing so. This effectively outlaws a more efficient business model, protecting the legacy schools that rely on the 1,500-hour tuition model.

4.3 A Counter-Narrative: The Louisville Beauty Academy (LBA) Model

Amidst this restrictive landscape, the Louisville Beauty Academy (LBA) offers a glimpse of what a competitive, market-driven model could look like.

• Debt-Free Model: LBA has pioneered a model that emphasizes affordability and “pay-as-you-go” options, reducing reliance on federal loans. By offering substantial tuition discounts for upfront payments or interest-free plans, they decouple the cost of education from the maximum available federal aid.²⁷
• Transparency and Ethics: By voluntarily aligning with federal accountability standards and focusing on “license-first” outcomes, LBA challenges the stereotype of the predatory for-profit. Their model explicitly avoids the “student labor” exploitation common in some schools, where students work in school salons for free under the guise of education.²⁹
• Niche Service: LBA focuses on serving underserved populations (immigrants, low-income) with a culturally competent approach. This demonstrates that small private businesses can address equity gaps that large, bureaucratic public systems often overlook.²⁹

The success of such models demonstrates that the private sector is capable of self-regulation and innovation if given the space to operate. It reinforces the argument that “profit” is not the enemy; misaligned incentives—often created by government mandates—are the problem.

V. Student Outcomes: The Myth of Public Superiority

A cornerstone of the argument for favoring public institutions is the presumption of superior quality. Critics of the private sector often point to higher default rates as evidence of failure. However, a rigorous analysis of student outcomes suggests that this presumption is often misplaced, particularly when controlling for student demographics, and that the public sector has its own crisis of completion.

5.1 The Completion Crisis in Community Colleges

Community colleges are the primary “public option” competitor to small private trade schools. While they offer lower tuition (heavily subsidized by taxpayers), their outcomes are frequently dismal.

• Completion Rates: National data indicates that fewer than 40% of community college students earn a certificate or degree within six years.³⁰ In some states, such as California, two-year completion rates hover in the low teens.³¹
• The “Hidden” Cost of Non-Completion: A low-tuition program that a student does not complete is arguably more expensive than a higher-tuition program that leads to a career. The student at the community college incurs “opportunity cost” (lost wages), eats up Pell Grant lifetime eligibility, and often leaves with debt but no credential—a worst-case scenario for default risk.³²

Table 2: Comparative Completion Metrics

Metric	Community Colleges (Public)	Private For-Profit (2-Year/Certificate)
On-Time Graduation Rate	~13% (2-year) 31	~60% (varies by sector) 33
6-Year Completion Rate	< 40% 30	~60-70% (Certificate programs)
Loan Default Rate	Lower (due to lower borrowing caps)	Higher (due to higher borrowing needs)
Demographic Skew	Mixed; often transfer-focused	Heavily low-income, older, minority

5.2 The “Apples to Oranges” Default Comparison

Critics of the private sector point to higher loan default rates at for-profit colleges.³⁴ However, this comparison often fails to account for the risk profile of the students. Private trade schools often serve older, non-traditional, and lower-income students who are statistically more likely to default regardless of where they attend.³²

When researchers control for student background, the “public advantage” shrinks or disappears. Furthermore, the “substitution effect” studies show that when for-profit colleges are sanctioned or closed, displaced students who transfer to community colleges do not necessarily see better completion outcomes. In fact, many drop out entirely, suggesting that the private sector was serving a niche that the public sector failed to engage effectively.³⁶

5.3 The Absorption Fallacy and Displaced Students

When the Department of Education forces the closure of a private school (often through the withdrawal of aid eligibility), the narrative is that students are “saved” and can now attend a “better” public option. This is the Absorption Fallacy.

• The Reality of Displacement: Research indicates that when for-profit colleges are sanctioned, enrollment in local community colleges increases, but only by about 60-70% of the lost enrollment.³⁶ This means roughly 30-40% of students—often the most vulnerable—exit the higher education system entirely.
• Funding the “Rescue”: The Department of Education often provides grants to community colleges to “absorb” these displaced students, such as the “Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students”.³⁸ This effectively creates a cycle where the government destroys a private competitor, then pays the public competitor to pick up the pieces, often with no guarantee that the public school offers the specific vocational training the student originally sought.
• Transfer of Credits: A major barrier to absorption is the refusal of many public universities to accept transfer credits from nationally accredited private schools, forcing students to restart their education from scratch. This academic protectionism—often defended as “quality control”—functions as an anti-competitive barrier that penalizes the student to protect the monopoly of the public system.⁴⁰

VI. Financial Aid and the “Funnel” Effect

The architecture of federal aid is designed to funnel students toward public institutions, not just through direct subsidies, but through the structure of accountability and relief programs.

6.1 Closed School Discharges as a Weapon

The “Closed School Discharge” program allows students to have their federal loans forgiven if their school closes while they are enrolled or shortly after they withdraw. While a necessary consumer protection, in practice, it has been weaponized to accelerate the demise of private schools.

• The Death Spiral: When the Department of Education restricts a private school’s access to cash (e.g., placing it on “Heightened Cash Monitoring”), the school’s liquidity dries up, forcing closure. The Department then discharges the loans, blaming the school for the closure it precipitated. The cost of these discharges is borne by taxpayers, and the students are encouraged to transfer to public institutions.⁴¹
• Public Immunity: Public schools rarely face this “death spiral” because they have state backing. Even if a public program is failing, it is “restructured,” not closed with mass loan discharges. This differential treatment insulates public systems from the ultimate market sanction: bankruptcy.

6.2 The Fiscal Impact of “Open Access”

Public universities defend their low graduation rates by citing their “open access” mission.⁴³ They argue that they accept students who are less prepared, and therefore lower completion rates are to be expected.

• The Contradiction: If “open access” excuses low completion rates for public schools, why does it not excuse similar rates for private schools that serve similar populations? Private schools are penalized for the very outcomes that public schools are excused for.
• Access without Completion: Policy analysts argue that “access without completion” is not a public good; it is a public expense. Funneling students into open-access public colleges where the majority will not graduate is a less efficient use of federal aid than supporting private schools with higher completion rates in specific technical fields.¹⁹

VII. Bringing Competition Back: A Framework for Competitive Neutrality

The ultimate goal of higher education policy should be to maximize human capital development. Achieving this requires a diverse ecosystem of providers—public, private non-profit, and private for-profit—competing on the basis of quality, relevance, and cost. To “bring competition back,” the regulatory framework must move from a sector-based approach to a market-neutral approach.

7.1 The Benefits of Competition

Competition forces providers to innovate. In a truly competitive market:

• Curriculum Adaptation: Small private schools can often update curricula in weeks to meet local employer needs, whereas public university curriculum committees may take years.
• Cost Containment: If federal subsidies were portable and tied strictly to outcomes (a “universal voucher” concept), schools would have to compete on price and value. Currently, public schools are shielded from price competition by direct subsidies that artificially lower the sticker price for students while keeping the cost to the taxpayer high.
• Student Service: Private schools treat students as customers who can take their business elsewhere. This often results in better career services, more flexible scheduling, and more personalized attention—factors that are critical for the success of non-traditional learners.³³

7.2 Recommendations for Policy Reform

To dismantle the asymmetric barriers and restore a healthy market, the following reforms are proposed:

1. Universal Accountability Standards: The 2026 “Do No Harm” proposal must be implemented without exemptions. If a program at a community college fails to increase graduate earnings above a high school diploma, it should face the same sanctions as a program at a for-profit college. This single standard would force all institutions to prove their value.²³
2. Funding Parity and Transparency: Policy discussions should acknowledge the total cost to the taxpayer (federal + state) when comparing efficiency. The 90/10 rule should either be applied to public institutions (counting state aid as “public”) or repealed as a discriminatory trade barrier.
3. Accreditation Reform: Decouple federal aid from regional accreditation. Allow for the recognition of specialized, outcomes-based accreditors that can approve innovative models (like bootcamps or apprenticeships) based on employment data rather than inputs like library size or faculty tenure. This would break the “cartel” of the regional accreditors.⁹
4. Licensing Reform: States should adopt “Safety-Only” licensing standards. Reduce mandated hours for cosmetology and other trades to the minimum necessary for health and safety, removing the “time tax” that protects incumbent schools and inflates student debt. Support models like the Louisville Beauty Academy that demonstrate the viability of lower-cost, debt-free education.⁷
5. Diplomatic Narrative Shift: Policymakers should reframe the debate from “Public vs. Private” to “High-Value vs. Low-Value.” Small private schools should be championed as “small businesses” that are vital to the local economy, rather than demonized as corporate predators. This aligns with broader political themes of supporting Main Street over bureaucracy.

7.3 Conclusion

The current trajectory of American higher education policy has been one of consolidation and regulatory capture. By normalizing heavy public-sector use of federal aid while concentrating scrutiny on small private providers, the system has effectively reduced competition. This has not resulted in higher quality; rather, it has insulated large public institutions from the need to improve their own often-dismal completion rates and labor market outcomes.

The evidence suggests that small private schools, despite the stigma attached to the “for-profit” label, fill a critical gap in the educational ecosystem. They offer flexibility, specialization, and speed that public bureaucracies struggle to match. The systematic dismantling of this sector through asymmetric regulation—weaponized by the lobbying power of the “Big Six”—deprives students of choice and taxpayers of efficiency.

To ensure a future of high-quality education, the United States must embrace a policy of Competitive Neutrality. By dismantling the artificial protections for the public sector and ending the punitive targeting of the private sector, we can restore a vibrant, competitive marketplace. In this market, any business—public or private—that delivers high-quality education will thrive, and the ultimate winner will be the student.

Works cited

1. Q&A on the For-Profit College “90-10 Rule”, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ticas.org/files/pub_files/90-10_qa.pdf
2. ACE, Other Higher Ed Groups Warn of Reconciliation Bill’s Harmful Impact on Students, Institutions – American Council on Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.acenet.edu/News-Room/Pages/ACE-Groups-Warn-Reconciliation-Bill-Harmful-Impact.aspx
3. Episode 74 – What’s next for higher education in 2025?, accessed January 15, 2026, https://career.org/web/web/Multimedia/Podcasts/What-s-next-for-higher-education-in-2025.aspx
4. annual – report – Career Education Colleges and Universities, accessed January 15, 2026, https://career.org/common/Uploaded%20files/Publications/Annual%20Report%202024%20Final.pdf
5. For-profit colleges big spenders in federal lobbying | Higher Ed Dive, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.highereddive.com/news/for-profit-colleges-big-spenders-in-federal-lobbying/428594/
6. 2018 Proprietary Higher Education Review: “The Greatest Show on Earth!” – Duane Morris, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/2018_proprietary_higher_education_review_greatest_show_on_earth_1218.html
7. Beauty School Debt and Drop-Outs – Institute for Justice, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ij.org/report/beauty-school-debt-and-drop-outs/
8. Does the 90/10 rule unfairly target proprietary institutions or under-resourced schools?, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/does-the-90-10-rule-unfairly-target-proprietary-institutions-or-under-resourced-schools/
9. Higher Education Accreditation and the Federal Government – Urban Institute, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/93306/higher-education-accreditation-and-the-federal-government.pdf
10. New report is the latest in recent attention on accrediting bodies, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ushe.edu/new-report-is-the-latest-in-recent-attention-on-accrediting-bodies/
11. Improving State Authorization: The State Role in Ensuring Quality and Consumer Protection in Higher Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://sheeo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/SHEEO_StateAuth.pdf
12. Accreditation Protects the Status Quo—It’s Time for Drastic Reform – Minding The Campus, accessed January 15, 2026, https://mindingthecampus.org/2025/03/03/accreditation-protects-the-status-quo-its-time-for-drastic-reform/
13. 90/10 – Questions and Answers | U.S. Department of Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/higher-education-laws-and-policy/9010-questions-and-answers
14. Licensing’s Negative Effects – Institute for Justice, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ij.org/report/license-to-work-3/report/licensings-negative-effects/heavy-costs-for-workers/
15. The 90/10 Rule Under HEA Title IV: Background and Issues – Congress.gov, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46773
16. Gainful Employment – Federal Student Aid, accessed January 15, 2026, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/ge
17. New Gainful Employment Rules Impact For-Profit and Nonprofit Colleges and Universities, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2023/10/new-gainful-employment-rules-impact-for-profit-and-nonprofit
18. For-Profit Colleges Say the Gainful Employment Rule Will Kill Access. Don’t Believe Them., accessed January 15, 2026, https://tcf.org/content/report/for-profit-colleges-say-the-gainful-employment-rule-will-kill-access-dont-believe-them/
19. Is Community College Worth It? A Comprehensive Return on Investment Analysis – FREOPP, accessed January 15, 2026, https://freopp.org/whitepapers/is-community-college-worth-it-a-comprehensive-return-on-investment-analysis/
20. The Gainful Employment Rule under a Second Trump Administration – Urban Institute, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/The_Gainful_Employment_Rule_under_a_Second_Trump_Administration.pdf
21. Statement of ACE Senior Vice President Terry W. Hartle on Repeal of Gainful Employment Regulations – American Council on Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.acenet.edu/News-Room/Pages/Statement-of-ACE-Senior-Vice-President-Terry-W–Hartle-on-Repeal-of-Gainful-Employment-Regulations.aspx
22. Financial Value Transparency and Gainful Employment Regulations: What We Know Now, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.bsk.com/news-events-videos/financial-value-transparency-and-gainful-employment-regulations-what-we-know-now
23. U.S. Department of Education Reaches Consensus on Historic New Accountability Framework and Concludes Higher Education Reform Rulemaking Sessions, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/us-department-of-education-reaches-consensus-historic-new-accountability-framework-and-concludes-higher-education-reform-rulemaking-sessions
24. AHEAD Committee’s Second Rulemaking Session Results in Consensus on Accountability Framework – American Council on Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.acenet.edu/News-Room/Pages/AHEAD-Committee-Second-Rulemaking-Session-Consensus-Accountability.aspx
25. Deep Dive: NASFAA Summary of Consensus on Accountability Language from Last Week’s AHEAD Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/37986/Deep_Dive_NASFAA_Summary_of_Consensus_on_Accountability_Language_from_Last_Week_s_AHEAD_Negotiated_Rulemaking_Committee
26. Cosmetology – The Institute for Justice, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/cosmetology/
27. Fast-Track & Debt-Free: How Louisville Beauty Academy Delivers …, accessed January 15, 2026, https://louisvillebeautyacademy.net/fast-track-debt-free-how-louisville-beauty-academy-delivers-the-double-scoop-save-big-and-start-earning-sooner-research-august-2025/
28. Louisville Beauty Academy: Leading the Way with Debt-Free Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://louisvillebeautyacademy.net/louisville-beauty-academy-leading-the-way-with-debt-free-education/
29. Louisville Beauty Academy’s Model vs. Typical U.S. Beauty Schools: A Comprehensive Comparison, accessed January 15, 2026, https://naba4u.org/2025/06/louisville-beauty-academys-model-vs-typical-u-s-beauty-schools-a-comprehensive-comparison/
30. Improving community college completion rates by addressing structural and motivational barriers – Brookings Institution, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/community-college-completion-rates-structural-and-motivational-barriers/
31. Higher Education in California: Improving College Completion, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/higher-education-in-california-improving-college-completion-october-2019.pdf
32. Community Colleges and Student Debt, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ccrc.tc.columbia.edu/publications/community-colleges-student-debt.html
33. The Real Costs and Benefits of For-Profit Colleges: What Graduates Have to Say, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.investopedia.com/the-real-costs-and-benefits-of-for-profit-colleges-what-graduates-have-to-say-11752799
34. Student Loan Default Rate: Facts and Statistics – Bestcolleges.com, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.bestcolleges.com/research/student-loan-default-rate-facts-statistics/
35. Who Is More Likely to Default on Student Loans? – Liberty Street Economics, accessed January 15, 2026, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/11/who-is-more-likely-to-default-on-student-loans/
36. Where Do Students Go When For-Profit Colleges Lose Federal Aid?, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20180265
37. Where Do Students Go when For-Profit Colleges Lose Federal Aid? – IDEAS/RePEc, accessed January 15, 2026, https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/22967.html
38. Disaster Recovery Unit | U.S. Department of Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.ed.gov/about/ed-offices/oese/disaster-recovery-unit
39. Defraying Costs of Enrolling Displaced Students Program | U.S. Department of Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.ed.gov/grants-and-programs/response-programs/defraying-costs-of-enrolling-displaced-students-program
40. Comments of National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients) to the Department of Education Re: Intent to – Student Loan Borrowers Assistance, accessed January 15, 2026, https://studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/comments-negotiate-student-loan-rules-july2017.pdf
41. New CB Vol TOC – FSA Partner Connect – Department of Education, accessed January 15, 2026, https://fsapartners.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/0405Vol6MasterFile.pdf
42. The Campus-Based Programs | 2025-2026 Federal Student Aid Handbook, accessed January 15, 2026, https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/fsa-handbook/2025-2026/vol6
43. U.S. Higher Education Effectiveness, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/2/1/2
44. Report: Selective Schools May Be Turning Away Qualified Low-Income Students – nasfaa, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.nasfaa.org/news-item/11848/Report_Selective_Schools_May_Be_Turning_Away_Qualified_Low-Income_Students
45. Community Colleges vs For-Profit Trade Schools – Spring 2021, Volume 4 – Issue 1, accessed January 15, 2026, https://southtexascollege.mycareerfocus.org/spring-2021-volume-4-issue-1/community-colleges-vs-for-profit-trade-schools/
46. Many Masters: Who Controls Accreditation Policy? – HigherEdJobs, accessed January 15, 2026, https://www.higheredjobs.com/blog/postDisplay.cfm?post=1906&blog=24